University of Tennessee College of Law

Legal Scholarship Repository: A Service of the Joel A. Katz Law
Library
UTK Law Faculty Publications
2-1997

An America without Judicial Independence
Penny White

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.utk.edu/utklaw_facpubs
Part of the Law Commons

DATE DOWNLOADED: Mon Mar 7 14:56:46 2022
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
Penny J. White, An America without Judicial Independance, 80 JUDICATURE 174 (1997).
ALWD 7th ed.
Penny J. White, An America without Judicial Independance, 80 Judicature 174 (1997).
APA 7th ed.
White, P. J. (1997). An America without Judicial Independance. Judicature, 80(4),
174-177.
Chicago 17th ed.
Penny J. White, "An America without Judicial Independance," Judicature 80, no. 4
(January-February 1997): 174-177
McGill Guide 9th ed.
Penny J. White, "An America without Judicial Independance" (1997) 80:4 Judicature
174.
AGLC 4th ed.
Penny J. White, 'An America without Judicial Independance' (1997) 80 Judicature 174.
MLA 8th ed.
White, Penny J. "An America without Judicial Independance." Judicature, vol. 80, no.
4, January-February 1997, p. 174-177. HeinOnline.
OSCOLA 4th ed.
Penny J. White, 'An America without Judicial Independance' (1997) 80 Judicature 174
Provided by:
University of Tennessee College of Law Joel A. Katz Law Library
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information

An

America
withoutj
Judges must be able
to make courageous
decisions without./ear
of reprisalfor resisting
the popularwill.

by Penny J. White

Just

pendence to justice in America?
Is it worth the struggle to mainessential as
is judicial
indetainhow
thejudiciary
a coequal,
independent branch of government?
My reflection leads me to a simple
conclusion: Judicial independence is
the backbone of the American democracy. It is essential not only to the

PENNY J. WHITE, a former justice of the
Tennessee Supreme Court, also has
served as a judge on the state's trial and
criminal appeals courts.

preservation of our system of justice,
but to the preservation of our system
of government as well.
Having made such an unconditional pronouncement, I must be
prepared to answer the obvious question: Why? Judicial independence
has been described as the "best expedient to secure a steady, upright, and
impartial administration of the law."
Chief Justice John Marshall declared
at the Virginia State Convention of
1829-30: "I have always thought from
my earliest youth... that the greatest
scourge an angry Heaven ever in-
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flicted upon an ungrateful and sin-

ning people was an ignorant, a corrupt or a dependentjudiciary."
And so we are told of its importance, its significance to freedom,
and we utter the phrase frequently,

but what is it? Why is judicial independence of upmost importance?
It is, simply put, the principle that

judges must be free to decide indiThis article is adapted from the author's address
to the University of Tennessee College of Law at
its First Monday program on October 8, 1996,
and from an essay published in the University of
Memphis Law Review.

Without the decisions of
courageousjudges, the author
argues, law enforcement
officers would be allowed to
search and seize evidence
regardlessof whether they
violated cherishedprinciples
of liberty.

cial independence
vidual cases according to the judge's was dismissed by James I for not ruling as James thought he ought to.
view of the law, not public opinion
about it. In a more eloquent descrip- Three subsequent kings dismissed
dozens of judges whose rulings did
tion, rising from the Supreme
Court's opinion in Bradley v. Fisher not please them. It was indeed a com(1871), it is described as
mon practice, understood by the
a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration ofjustice that a judicial officer, in exercising
authority..., shall be free to act upon his
own convictions, without apprehension
of personal consequences to himself.
In order to have judicial independence, the legal system must protect
judges from outside pressures that
would force them to deviate from
their interpretation of the law and
the facts.
The principle of judicial independence originated in the legal system
of England. There, judges were originally appointed to serve at the king's
pleasure. When their actions or decisions displeased the king, they were
removed. And so it was with Lord
Coke, the distinguished jurist, the
chiefjustice of the King's Bench, who

ful to think about where we would be
without it.

Practical significance
Our courts would be quite different

had judicial independence not been
a foundation of our legal system. No
legislative acts would be subject to judicial review because Chief Justice

judges, and the expedient ones governed themselves accordingly.
Finally, in 1688, the Glorious
Revolution led to the deposing of Marshall would have minded the
King James II, the coronation of Jefferson administration, which charKing William and Queen Mary, and acterized Marbury v. Madison as a brathe appointment of judges to serve zen attempt by the judiciary to med"during good behavior." As a corol- dle unlawfully in the business of the
lary to this necessary element of ju- executive. Poll taxes, literacy tests,
dicial independence, the Crown en- loyalty oaths, political gerrymanderdorsed a fixed salary for judges so ing, segregated public accommodathat neither Parliament nor the tions, and lynchings would all have
Crown could directly or indirectly survived because the judiciary would
have been powerless to question , let
influence judges' decisions.
alone invalidate, the actions of the
stateThese historical, academic
ments about judicial independence legislative or executive branches.
Judges, prosecutors, police officmay be helpful in assessing its signifiers,
and defense attorneys would not
cance to our system of justice, but
have
to worry about suppression mothey are not nearly as helpful as the
practical ones. Thus, in thinking tions; without judicial independence
about what judicial independence is Mapp v. Ohio would never have been
and how essential it may be, it is help- decided. Federal agents who violated
January-February1997
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the Constitution in their searches
and seizures historically turned the
evidence over to state courts, or
helped state agents do the deed
themselves, since the Bill of Rights
only applied to federal government
action. It certainly was unpopular,
not the will of the people, for the
1961 Supreme Court to deem those
rights, or at least those in the Fourth
Amendment, equally applicable to
the states.
Indigents would not have to be
given counsel except as provided by
state law, because the 1963 decision
of Gideon v. Wainwright would not
have occurred. Nor would 1967's In
re Gault, giving juveniles certain procedural due process protections. It
did not please the public to rule that
hard-earned tax dollars had to be
used to give free lawyers to poor
adults and juveniles accused of breaking into the homes of taxpayers, assaulting them, and sometimes killing

The U.S. Supreme
Court's unpopular
decision in Brown v.
Board of Education
paved the way to
abolishing "separate
but equal" schools.

from self-incrimination, no need to
determine whether confessions are
them. Without judicial indepen- voluntary and, therefore, admissible.
dence, our courts could avoid the
Now before this America without
backlog caused by a shortage of pub- judicial independence sounds enticlic defenders because there would be ing, or at least a lot less complicated,
no right to and no need for lawyers.
recall a few other omissions from our
Additionally, there would be no courtrooms. Many civil cases would
hearings to determine the admissibil- be nonexistent, since legislatures
ity of confessions. We could return to would have subsumed many private
circumstances such as those in Davis and public corporations. Why? Bev. North Carolina where officers cause the public pressure against the
prompted confessions by depriving decision reached in the 1819 case of
suspects of food and water and forc- Dartmouth College v. Woodward would
ing them to run shackled alongside have been great enough to deter the
police cars. We would not wonder Supreme Court from enforcing the
whether officers gave Miranda warn- contract clause against state governings, because there would be no such ment. In fact, many historians sugthing as a Miranda warning. Without gest that in the absence of the Dartthe Court's ruling in Escobedo v. Illi- mouth College case from the Supreme
nois, there would be no need to deter- Court waterfront, courts would
mine whether a confession was vol- barely have civil dockets because priuntary or was extracted through vate business would have feared the
physical violence or intimidation. encroachment of government and
Had the Supreme Court in 1965 would not have dared to invest their
ruled based on a popular vote, based capital to build and stimulate our
on public opinion, based on the economy. Likewise, had the Court
whim of the American citizenry, not stymied the state's taxation atthere would be no need to advise de- tempts in McCullough v. Maryland,
fendants of their right to be free our economy would certainly have
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evolved differently, if it had evolved
at all.
And what about the few civil cases
that would exist? None would involve African-American litigants.
The public sentiment that led the
court to make the Dred Scott decision, depriving African-Americans
of their standing as citizens, would
have continued to sway the courts.
The public outcry that followed
Brown v. Board of Education would

have been anticipated, and as a result, the ruling would not have
been made, Dred Scott would have
stood, the Civil War amendments
would have remained hollow, and
our country would have remained
as divided as it was in
1857 when the Court
handed down the Dred
Scott decision.
Without judicial independence, circuit judges
would not have to worry
about Batson and its progeny, which disallow the use
of peremptory challenges
to strike women and minorities from juries. There
would be no Batson challenges because there
would be no minority ju-

courageous judges is the recognition
of courageous advocates. In almost
every case that demonstrates the
principle of judicial independence
and judicial courage, the courageous
judicial decision is preceded and
prompted by courageous advocacy.
Who argued the case of Dartmouth
College v. Woodward in the U.S. Su-

preme Court? Daniel Webster. And
Gideon? Abe Fortas, who went on to
serve as an associate justice from
1965 until 1969. Brown? Thurgood
Marshall, who served 23 distinguished years on the Supreme Court.
History is replete with other examples of courageous advocacy resulting in courageous verdicts and

Those who want judges
to rule based on
majoritypublicopinion
have never been
in the minority.

rors. Taylor v. Louisianaand

numerous other decisions would
never have been reached because the
public pressure to keep juries all
white, all male would have defeated
the notion that judges ought to apply
the law equally and fairly.

Upholding the promise
We could go on and on with national
examples of what America would look
like without judicial independence.
Courts from the highest to the lowest
in this land have made decisions
throughout history that were unpopular, unaccepted, and unenforced. That is important to remember. Moreover, it is important that we
support courageous independent
judges so that they do not fall victim
to the clamor of an excited people,
the tyranny of public opinion. It is important that we undergird them with
the strength to uphold the promise.
As important as the recognition of

decisions in the face of tyrannous
public opinion. John Adams and
Josiah Quincy defended Captain
Preston of Boston Massacre infamy
despite criticisms that they were British sympathizers, opponents of American independence. In a letter to his
father who questioned his decision to
become an advocate for those criminals charged with murdering their
fellow citizens,Josiah Quincy replied:
Let such be told, Sir, that these criminals,
charged with murder, are not yet legally
proven guilty, and therefore, however
criminal, are entitled by the laws of God
and man to all legal counsel and aid; that
my duty as a man obliged me to undertake; that my duty as a lawyer strengthened the obligation. I never harbored
the expectation nor any great desire that
all men should speak well of me. To inquire my duty, and do it, is my aim.
We can only assume that Adams' and
Quincy's in-court advocacy was as
Januay-February1997

strong: The Boston jury acquitted.
In the case of Leopold and Loeb,
despite the heinousness of the crime
and the outcry of the public against
the two wealthy, spoiled geniuses,
Clarence Darrow convinced the
judge that justice required a life sentence: "It is not for these boys for
whom I argue, it is for the infinite
number who are to follow, those who
can't be as well defended, those who
will go through the tempest without
the aid of counsel."
If courageous advocates make courageousjudges, the absence of courageous advocates encourages timidity
on the bench. And so we remember
some of our country's darkest hours,
in Salem, when 200 people, mostly women, were
hanged, after verdicts by
white male judges and
white male juries deemed
them guilty of witchcraft.
Almost none of the condemned were represented by counsel.
Courageous advocates
make courageous judges.
And courage infiltrates
the proceedings, breeds
fairness, and strengthens
the judge who wants to do
the right thing.
All judges face the likelihood of
being publicly criticized, ostracized, and attacked for decisions
they must make. Let us remind the
public that a judge who looks to another branch of government to be
told how to rule on important legal
and social issues is not doing his or
her job and is risking the freedom
of us all. Let us explain why ajudge
who publicly promises in advance
to rule a certain way on a certain issue is not judging, is not worthy of
judging, but is simply politicking.
Let us remind the public that those
who want judges to rule based on
majority public opinion have never
been in the minority. And finally,
let us remind the public of the
words in Absalom and Achitophel:

"Nor is the people's judgment always true; the most may err as
grossly as the few." ll
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